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I. INTRODUCTION

From the hundreds of trademark cases decided in any year, it is
often difficult to discern any particular theme. There are cases from
many different areas raising very disparate issues. In 2010, however,
trademark dilution stands out as the area with the most prominent
doctrinal opinions. In addition to three court of appeals decisions,1 there
were five significant Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”)
decisions2 from an entity whose prior involvement in dilution had been

* Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. © 2011 by David S. Welkowitz.
1. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011);
Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v.
Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1003 (2011).
2. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B.
2010), aff’d, No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012); Nat’l Pork Bd. v. Supreme
Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Am. Express Mktg. & Dev.
Corp. v. Gilad Dev. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Fiat Grp. Autos., S.p.A. v.
ISM, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Citigroup, Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp.
Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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very much the exception. These dilution opinions form the centerpiece
of this discussion.
There were, of course, other notable decisions involving
contributory infringement3 and the continuing saga of Google
AdWords.4 For good measure, there is a small detour into the related
field of rights of publicity and the issue of what constitutes commercial
speech.5 But, first things first, and dilution deserves to be front and
center this year.
II. THE RETURN (REVENGE?) OF VICTORIA’S SECRET
Probably not since the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Moseley
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.6 has dilution been in the forefront of judicial
decision making in trademark law. The Court’s decision, interpreting
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”)7 to require a
showing of “actual dilution,” as opposed to likelihood of dilution, set in
motion a concerted effort to amend the statute. That effort resulted in
the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”),8 which
changed the operative standard to likelihood of dilution and added new
definitions of a “famous” mark,9 “dilution by blurring,”10 and “dilution
by tarnishment.”11 Ironically, however, the Supreme Court’s decision
did not bring finality to the case before it, involving Victoria’s Secret
and a store in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, originally called “Victor’s
Secret,” then changed to “Victor’s Little Secret.”12 The Court remanded
the case to the Sixth Circuit,13 which took no action for four years before
remanding it back to the District Court.14 By that time, the TDRA had

3. See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 647 (2010).
4. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Utah 2010);
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010).
5. See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Dryer v.
Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Minn. 2010).
6. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
7. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)
(amended 2006)).
8. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
12. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003).
13. Id. at 434.
14. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 (D. Ky. 2008), aff’d, 605
F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1003 (2011).
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replaced the FTDA, changing the operative language of the statute.15
The District Court reexamined the case under the TDRA. The court
determined that there was no likelihood of dilution by blurring but that
there was a likelihood of dilution by tarnishment.16
The Sixth Circuit affirmed on appeal.17 However, its rationale for
upholding the tarnishment claim merits particular scrutiny.18 The court
held that there would be a rebuttable presumption19 of a likelihood of
dilution by tarnishment20 where the unauthorized use of a famous mark
was a use in a sexual context. The court justified its creation of the
presumption by citing a number of cases in which sexually oriented uses
had been found tarnishing.21 Although the presumption is rebuttable, it
is unclear how, absent a well-conducted survey, one could successfully
rebut the presumption.
There was a forceful dissent in the case by Judge Moore.22 She
found the evidence put forth by Victoria’s Secret to be inadequate to
demonstrate a likelihood of harm to the reputation of its mark.23 More
critically, she questioned the basis for assuming, as the majority did, that
any sexually based use would necessarily be likely to cause such harm:
“That a consumer may associate a negative-sounding junior mark with a
famous mark says little of whether the consumer views the junior mark
as harming the reputation of the famous mark.”24
Although conceding that it was possible that such harm would
occur, she pointed to the statutory standard that requires a likelihood of
dilution and asserted that Victoria’s Secret had not demonstrated that
harm was more likely than not to occur.25 Finally, she noted that

15. Id. at 737-38. Had the Sixth Circuit remanded the case immediately, the case would have
been decided under the more restrictive standard of the FTDA.
16. Id. at 749-50.
17. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 1003 (2011).
18. Id. (affirming the judgment of the District Court but did not discuss the dilution by
blurring claim).
19. Id. (Gibbons, J., concurring). The concurring judge preferred (preferring to call it an
inference, rather than a presumption). Id. The difference is not trivial, since there is no requirement
that an unrebutted inference be accepted. But one would expect most courts to accept the inference.
Id.
20. Id. at 385, 387-88.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 391 (Moore, J., dissenting).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 392 (quoting Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 110 (2d
Cir. 2009)).
25. Id. at 394.
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Victoria’s Secret had cultivated a less than wholesome reputation and
stated that this should be relevant in the analysis.26
To determine whether dilution by tarnishment or blurring is likely
to occur is a very difficult task. The TDRA’s factors for blurring have
not been applied consistently by courts, and the statute does not list any
factors to guide the tarnishment analysis.27 Thus, it is interesting that the
Sixth Circuit chose to create a simpler decision path by creating a
presumption.28 Whether the presumption is factually well-founded is a
separate question. The fact that several courts have held sexually
oriented uses to be tarnishing29 may say more about the sensibilities of
courts faced with sexually oriented uses than the actual harm to the
reputations of famous marks. Nevertheless, the court’s holding may
signal a new wave of decisions designed to simplify and unify the
analysis of dilution.30 It will be interesting to see whether future courts
create new presumptions, especially for drug-oriented parodies of
famous marks.31
III. WHEN IS EVISA NOT A VISA?
A second court of appeals decision, this one from the Ninth Circuit,
examined blurring in the context of common word trademarks.32 JSL
Corporation operated eVisa, which was run via the website
According to the eVisa website, eVisa is a
www.evisa.com.33
“multilingual education and information business.”34 Apparently JSL
Corporation used the name eVisa “to suggest ‘the ability to travel, both
linguistically and physically, through the English speaking world.’”35
Visa International Service Association, which owns the VISA credit card
mark, sued JSL, claiming trademark dilution by blurring. Because JSL
26. Id. at 395.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
28. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 385. This is not the first presumption to be created
for dilution. Prior to the TDRA, some courts presumed that if the marks used by each side were
identical then there was a presumption of actual dilution. See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391
F.3d 439, 452-53 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 (2005).
29. Some of the citations by the Sixth Circuit were to cases decided under state dilution laws.
However, it is not clear that the TDRA’s definition of tarnishment is fundamentally different than
the implicit definition used in those cases.
30. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 390.
31. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo USA, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 728-29 (N.D. Ill.
1989); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. Visa Int’l Serv. Assn. v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010).
33. Id. at 1089.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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conceded that the VISA mark was famous prior to the first use of eVisa
and that eVisa was used in commerce, the only issue in the case was
likelihood of dilution.36 Although the TDRA contains six factors to
assist courts when analyzing blurring, the Ninth Circuit did not look to
those factors.37 The court held that the eVisa mark was “effectively
identical” to the VISA mark.38 That holding, plus the court’s conclusion
that “Visa is a strong trademark,” was sufficient for the court to permit
entry of summary judgment.39 The notion that use of an identical mark
will normally suffice to show dilution predates the TDRA; the Second
Circuit has held that it created a presumption of dilution sufficient to
satisfy the more stringent “actual dilution” standard under the original
FTDA.40
But that was not all there was to the case. JSL claimed that because
“visa” is a common word and because eVisa invoked the common
meaning of the word, it was insulated from dilution liability.41 The court
rejected this argument for essentially two reasons. First, Visa’s use of
the word as a mark was sufficiently distinct from the common definition
of the word to make it sufficiently unique for dilution protection.42
Thus, the court focused in part on the famous trademark owner’s
distinctiveness.43
Second, the court found that eVisa “is not using the word visa for
its literal dictionary definition.”44 Such a use might well insulate it from
liability. However, the eVisa business was also distinct from the “visa”
business, making eVisa a mark that stood on its own.45 It is not clear
whether a trademark use, that nevertheless directly invoked the
dictionary definition of the term, would be deemed actionable by the
court. The TDRA clearly excludes non-trademark uses of descriptive
terms from liability, something the court did not discuss. Whether the
court would extend the same principle to a trademark use cannot be
36. Id. at 1090.
37. Id. at 1090, 1091.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Savin Corp. v. Savin Grp., 391 F.3d 439, 452-53 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
822 (2005). The Ninth Circuit also referred to this concept. See Visa Int’l Serv. Assn., 610 F.3d at
1090 (use identical marks as “circumstantial evidence” of dilution) (citing Horphag Research Ltd. v.
Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)).
41. Visa Int’l Serv. Assn., 610 F.3d at 1091.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1089-90.
44. Id. at 1092.
45. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006) (“fair use” of a famous mark in a
descriptive, non-trademark manner is not actionable).
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determined. Also unclear is the relation between this case and a parody
use, such as the one in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, LLC,46 where the Fourth Circuit denied relief from a trademark use
that parodied the Louis Vuitton trademark.
IV. SIMILARITY REDUX
It has long been regarded as axiomatic that in order to be likely to
cause dilution of a well-known mark, a second user’s mark must be
“substantially similar” to the well-known mark. Thus, substantial
similarity has been a threshold requirement, the absence of which has
been regarded as fatal to a dilution claim. However, recent cases have
held that when Congress enacted the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006, it changed the applicable standard of similarity.47
The latest case on this topic is from the Ninth Circuit, Levi Strauss
& Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.48 Until Levi Strauss, the
Ninth Circuit adhered to a standard that required a showing that the two
marks at issue were “identical or nearly identical” to support a dilution
claim.49 Even after the TDRA, the Ninth Circuit had referred to, and
apparently applied, its “identical or nearly identical” standard.50
However, in Levi Strauss, the Ninth Circuit decided to reexamine its
prior precedent in light of the language of the TDRA.51
The court first traced its use of the existing standard, noting its
origins in state law and its consonance with the original language of the
FTDA.52 The court then examined the language of the TDRA, pointing
to the fact that it constituted a wholesale revision of the FTDA.53 It
examined its post-TDRA case law, concluding that none of the cases

46. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir.
2007).
47. See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th
Cir. 2011); Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
48. Levi-Strauss, 633 F.3d 1158. The Trademark Trial & Appeal Board also has weighed in
on this issue. See infra Part V.
49. E.g., Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002),
superceded by statute, as stated in Levi Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1162.
50. See, e.g., Visa Int’l Serv. Assn. v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010) (“the
marks here are effectively identical”); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 635 (9th Cir.
2008); Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007).
51. Levi-Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1162-66.
52. Id. at 1163-65.
53. Id. at 1165-66.
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“presented or squarely resolved” whether the prior standard continued to
apply under the TDRA.54
Having decided to reexamine the issue, the court compared the
language of the original FTDA with the TDRA.
The TDRA
incorporates similarity in the definition of blurring, requiring an
association “arising from the similarity between [the famous mark and
the second mark].”55 It does not expressly require “substantial”
similarity or any other additional similarity.56 Further, the court noted
that the first of the statutory factors listed as possible guides to finding
dilution is the “degree of similarity” between the two marks—again with
no added qualifier.57 Although no qualifier appears in the original
FTDA, the term “similarity” was also absent from the original
definition58 (there were no factors under the original statute either), and
the court believed that “Congress did not wish to be tied to the language
or interpretation of prior law.”59 It is not clear why the court thought
this—it cited no legislative history or other material suggesting that
Congress actually considered the question. Nevertheless, as the court
stated, its conclusion that the TDRA changed the standard was
consistent with the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Starbucks Corp. v.
Wolfe’s Borough Coffee Inc.,60 decided just over a year earlier.61
It is unclear where Levi Strauss and Starbucks have left the issue of
similarity. As the Ninth Circuit stated, similarity continues to be a
crucial element in analyzing dilution.62 If the two marks at issue are not

54. Id. at 1167. The court noted that the Perfumebay.com case technically involved California
law, and that California law had not then been amended to reflect the TDRA. Id. Regarding its
subsequent Jada Toys decision, the court noted that because it found that the mark in question could
have satisfied the identical or nearly identical standard (to defeat a motion for summary judgment),
and because the court’s focus was on the change from actual dilution under the FTDA to likelihood
of dilution under the TDRA, there was no need then to reexamine its standard. Id. at 1168-69.
Finally, as to its Visa opinion, the court stated that its reference to “nearly identical” was simply a
factual statement about the apparent identity of the marks, not a comment on the proper legal
standard. Id. at 1170.
55. Id. at 1171 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1172.
58. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
59. Levi-Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1172, 1176.
60. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
61. The court then decided that the District Court’s application of the identical or nearly
identical standard was not harmless error and remanded. Levi-Strauss, 633 F.3d at 1173-74.
62. Id. at 1171 (“No doubt, similarity has a special role to play in the implementation of the
new statute’s multifactor approach”). This became apparent in the decision on remand in the
Starbucks case. The District Court noted the relative lack of similarity between the marks in context
while deciding that there was no likelihood of dilution. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough
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sufficiently similar, then there will be no association, or at least too weak
an association, to be likely to cause any diminution of the distinctiveness
of the famous mark. However, the Levi Strauss and Starbucks approach
probably will make it more difficult for dilution defendants to defeat the
claim on a motion for summary judgment because the analysis will be
more context driven.
V. THE TTAB ENTERS THE ARENA
Starting in 1999, one could oppose an application to register a
trademark with the Patent and Trademark Office on the grounds that the
applicant’s mark may dilute the opposer’s (famous) mark.63 An
opposition on those (or other) grounds would be brought before the
PTO’s TTAB.64 Until 2010, the TTAB was a minor participant in the
dilution game, issuing only two decisions of real consequence.65 Then,
in 2010, the TTAB came alive, issuing five precedential dilution
decisions that covered a range of issues.66
Perhaps the most significant TTAB decision is National Pork
Board v. Supreme Lobster and Seafood Co.,67 in which the TTAB
upheld a challenge based on blurring.68 The National Pork Board
(NPB), owner of the slogan THE OTHER WHITE MEAT to promote
pork, opposed Supreme Lobster and Seafood’s application to register
THE OTHER RED MEAT for salmon.69
In any dilution claim, the mark’s owner must prove that its mark is
“famous”—that is, the mark is “widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States.”70 In this case, NPB had its own
Coffee, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 5981(LTS)(THK), 2011 WL 6747431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011)
(citing a “minimal degree of similarity”).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2006). See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION:
FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 217-18, 590 (Supp. 2011) (discussing the history of
this provision).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (2008).
65. NASDAQ Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Antartica, S.r.l., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718 (T.T.A.B.
2003); Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1164 (T.T.A.B. 2001).
66. Nat’l. Pork Bd. v. Supreme Lobster & Seafood Co., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, (T.T.A.B.
2010); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning Servs., LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B.
2010), aff’d, No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012); Am. Express Mktg. &
Dev. v. Gilad Dev. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Fiat Grp. Autos. S.p.A v.
ISM Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 2010); Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp.
Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645 (T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
67. Supreme Lobster, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479.
68. Id. at 1497.
69. Id. at 1481.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006). The mark normally must also be famous before the
defendant’s first use of the mark. However, in an intent to use registration case, the mark needs to
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studies showing a very high degree of awareness as well as a study by
Northwestern University, indicating a similar awareness of the slogan.71
Based on this record, plus the fairly large advertising expenditures over a
quarter century72 and third-party references,73 the TTAB found the mark
to be famous.74
Turning to the issue of blurring, the TTAB identified similarity as a
crucial factor in the analysis.75 Unlike the Visa case, the marks here
were not identical.76 Nevertheless, the differences between them were
small (only one word) and they conjured up similar contexts, such as a
comparison to other foods. That, along with the high degree of
association between the two slogans found by a survey, led the Board to
find them “highly similar.”77 The TTAB then conducted an interesting
analysis of the factor of degree of distinctiveness by looking almost
exclusively at the degree of inherent distinctiveness possessed by the
slogan.78 Although the TTAB did not explain its narrow focus, it
appears that it assumed the more unique a mark was (as measured by
inherent distinctiveness), the more likely it would be blurred by a highly
similar mark.79 The other statutory factors for blurring80 were also found
to favor NPB81 and actual association was shown by a survey.82 Thus,
the Board found likely dilution by blurring.83
be famous before the application for registration is filed. See Supreme Lobster, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1490.
71. Supreme Lobster, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1490. The TTAB rejected applicant’s attack on the
methodology of the study. Id. The Board also held that a promotional slogan for a commodity
could act as a trademark, even though it did not promote a particular source for the commodity. Id.
at 1493-94.
72. Id. at 1495. The expenditures totaled almost $550 million. Id.
73. Id. at 1496.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1497.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1497-98.
78. Id. at 1497.
79. Cf. Virgin Enters., Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that a highly
inherently distinctive mark more likely to be confused with similar mark than less distinctive mark).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2006) lists the following factors:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially
exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the
famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.
Id.
81. Supreme Lobster, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1497-98.
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An interesting contrast to National Pork Board is Coach Services,
Inc. v. Triumph Learning Services, LLC,84 where handbag and accessory
maker, Coach, opposed the registration of COACH as a mark for
educational software.85 On its dilution claim, the TTAB found that
Coach had not shown that its mark was famous.86 The TTAB found
Coach’s brand awareness study not probative because of a lack of any
witness to support its methodology. The TTAB also found that the study
itself only showed awareness among a limited audience, women between
the ages of 13 and 24, and omitted not only other women, but men.87
Nevertheless, the TTAB finished the dilution analysis and concluded
that the factors did not favor a finding of dilution by blurring. The
TTAB determined the two marks were dissimilar “because of their
distinct meanings and commercial impressions,” the lack of evidence of
intent to create an association, and there was no evidence of actual
association between the marks.88
A third important decision, American Express Marketing &
Development Corp. v. Gilad Development Corp.,89 involved the use of
the statutory exclusions from dilution.90 When American Express
opposed the registration of GRAND AMERICAN EXPRESS
CLEVELAND AND COLUMBUS, the applicant claimed, among other
things, that it was protected by the non-commercial use exclusion of the
TDRA.91 However, the TTAB ruled that the non-commercial use
exclusion cannot be invoked by an applicant in an opposition
proceeding.92 The courts’ primary basis for this ruling was that an
“applicant cannot claim non-commercial use of its marks when it is
required to demonstrate use of its marks in commerce as service marks
82. Id. at 1497.
83. Id. at 1498. In one other interesting twist, the TTAB declined to discuss the opposer’s
alternate ground of likelihood of confusion. Id. Normally, the TTAB operates in reverse; it reviews
the confusion ground, then declines to discuss dilution when it finds confusion. Id. “Because we
have found for opposer in connection with its likelihood of dilution claim, we do not reach its claim
of likelihood of confusion.” Id.
84. Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B.
2010), aff’d, No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012).
85. Id. at 1601.
86. Id. at 1611.
87. Id. Here, it is relevant to note that the TDRA requires that a famous mark be widely
recognized by the “general consuming public.” 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2)(A) (2006).
88. Coach, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1614-15.
89. Am. Express Mktg. & Dev. v. Gilad Dev. Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294 (T.T.A.B.
2010).
90. Id. at 1296; see § 1125(c)(3)(A)-(C).
91. § 1125(c)(3)(C).
92. Am. Express, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1298.
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[or trademarks] in order to obtain federal registrations.”93 Although this
will normally be true, and was in this case, it may not always be true.
First of all, in any dilution claim, to be actionable, the unauthorized use
must be a “use in commerce.”94 The TTAB’s conclusion would appear
to make the non-commercial use exclusion superfluous. Second,
Congress specifically limited another exclusion, the “fair use” exclusion,
to non-trademark uses.95 Thus, non-commercial uses most likely include
some trademark uses as well. Finally, a “use in commerce” may still be
a “noncommercial use.”96 Interpreting the original FTDA, the Ninth
Circuit found “commercial use in commerce” to be different than
“noncommercial use.”97 It stands to reason that a “use in commerce”
could also include “non-commercial uses.” Nevertheless, it would be a
rare circumstance in which an applicant legitimately could assert that its
use will be non-commercial.98
In a fourth case, Fiat Group Automobiles, S.p.A. v. ISM, Inc.,99 an
opposer, who did not even use its mark in the United States, claimed that
the applicant’s proposed PANDA mark would cause dilution of the its
mark. The opposer, Fiat, sells automobiles in the United States.100 It
does not, however, sell a PANDA automobile or any other PANDA
product in the United States.101 Can a mark not used in this country
claim dilution protection in this situation?
It is a source of contention whether a mark not used in this country
can claim any protection under federal trademark law.102 The TTAB did
not need to resolve the problem, although its opinion leaves tantalizing
clues about its intentions. As we have seen, a plaintiff or opposer must

93. Id.
94. § 1125(a)(1).
95. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
96. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903-06 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1171 (2003).
97. Id. at 903-04.
98. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 63, at 605.
99. Fiat Grp. Autos. S.p.A v. ISM Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
100. Id. at 1111.
101. Id.
102. Compare ITC, Ltd v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating no
protection under Lanham Act for mark not used in U.S.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007), with
Grupo Gigante, S.A. de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing
protection from confusion for mark not used but well-known in a portion of the United States,
remanded to determine if it met the well-known marks exception & the court held so far Plaintiff
had not met its burden to establish protection of the mark). See also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.,
880 N.E.2d 852, 859 (N.Y. 2007) (stating that a mark not used in the United States may claim
protection under New York unfair competition law).
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have a “famous” mark to be eligible for dilution protection.103 The
TDRA’s definition of a famous mark specifically requires that it be
widely recognized by consumers in the United States.104 The TTAB
interpreted this to mean that the mark must be “used” in the United
States, although not necessarily in a manner sufficient to create
trademark rights in the United States.105 Thus, a “use analogous to
trademark use” (e.g., advertising) could be sufficient if it created
sufficient renown among U.S. consumers.106 Also, filing an Intent to
Use application would suffice, again assuming the requisite recognition
among U.S. consumers.107 But then, the TTAB opened the door to
eligibility a bit wider, by assuming the “possibility” that a mark not used
at all might obtain the requisite recognition for fame.108 However, it did
not need to go further, because the evidence in Fiat’s case was
insufficient under any measurement of recognition.109
Finally, the TTAB considered the required degree of similarity
between the litigants’ uses in Citigroup, Inc. v. Capital City Bank
Group, Inc.110 Although the Second Circuit had just held that the TDRA
mandated no specific level of similarity,111 the TTAB thought that a
significant degree of similarity was necessary if the process of dilution
was to occur—that is, if consumers would see the same mark as
signifying two different sources.112 The TTAB continued to apply this
standard in the Coach case.113

103. See supra notes 70, 74, 80, 86, and 87 and accompanying text.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (“. . . mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of
the mark’s owner.”).
105. Fiat Grp. Autos. S.p.A v. ISM Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1115 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
106. Id. at 1114-15.
107. Id. at 1115.
108. Id. at 1114 n.5.
109. Id. at 1115.
110. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp. Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1645 (T.T.A.B.
2010), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
111. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2009). As
discussed above, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its “identical or nearly identical” standard of
similarity in favor of the Second Circuit’s approach. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch
Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1611 (9th Cir. 2011), discussed supra text accompanying notes 49-62.
But this took place after the TTAB’s decision.
112. Citigroup, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1667. Note that the TTAB found a “high degree” of
similarity in the National Pork Board case when it found a likelihood of dilution. Id. In this case,
the degree of similarity was insufficient to support a finding of dilution. Id. But see Nike, Inc. v.
Maher, 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018 (T.T.A.B. 2011) (adopting the Starbucks-Levi Strauss
approach).
113. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning Servs., Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1613
(T.T.A.B. 2010), aff’d, No. 2011-1129, 2012 WL 540069 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2012).
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VI. BEYOND DILUTION: CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
In 2010, the Second Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.114 Although there was a collateral dilution
issue in the case, the main issues involved infringement, particularly
contributory infringement.115
Tiffany claimed that a sizeable percentage of Tiffany branded
merchandise sold on eBay is counterfeit.116 Tiffany alleged that eBay
obtained fees from merchants who sold counterfeits. Tiffany alleged
also that eBay promoted Tiffany merchandise sales through
advertisements on eBay’s web site and through “sponsored links”
advertisements on search engines such as Yahoo or Google.117 Thus,
Tiffany claimed both direct infringement (through the sponsored links
and eBay website advertising) and contributory infringement (by
facilitating the sales on eBay).118 The court easily rejected the direct
infringement claim, noting that long-standing precedent permitted eBay
to advertise sales of branded merchandise as long as the advertising is
truthful and does not suggest any endorsement by the brand owner.119
That left the contributory infringement claim.120
Turning to the contributory infringement claim, the court applied
the test formulated by the Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories, Inc.
v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.121 The Inwood test gives two possible bases
for contributory liability: (1) intentionally inducing the direct infringer
to infringe a mark, or (2) “continu[ing] to supply its [services] to one
whom [defendant] knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement.”122 It was clear that the first base of the test did
not apply, leaving the “knowing or having reason to know” as the basis
for any liability.123 Tiffany’s case did not rely on those sellers whose
114. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647
(2010).
115. Id. at 112-13. As to direct liability for dilution, the court found no use of a second mark
by eBay that would dilute Tiffany’s mark. Id. The other dilution issue involved contributory
liability. Id. The court found the doctrine of contributory dilution questionable but in any case
unfounded on the facts of the case. Id.
116. Id. at 97.
117. Id. at 100-01.
118. Id. at 101-04.
119. Id. at 101-03.
120. Id. at 105. A preliminary issue was whether contributory infringement applied to the act
of providing services to the direct infringer, rather than supplying products. Id. However, eBay
abandoned that issue on appeal. See id. at 105-06.
121. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
122. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106 (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 854).
123. Id.
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activities Tiffany specifically brought to eBay’s attention as sellers of
counterfeits.124 Instead, its core claim was that eBay had sufficient
knowledge that sellers of Tiffany-branded merchandise were
predominantly selling counterfeits, which deemed eBay complicit and
contributorily liable if it did not stop the sale of Tiffany-branded items
on eBay.125 Tiffany pointed to the many notices of actual counterfeits it
provided to eBay, the complaints to eBay from buyers and the results of
a Tiffany buying program that it provided to eBay to support this
claim.126 The key question was whether such generalized knowledge of
widespread counterfeit sales, as opposed to specific knowledge of
particular infringing sales, was sufficient to create liability. 127 The
Second Circuit, agreeing with the District Court, held that “a service
provider must have more than a general knowledge or reason to know
that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods.”128 Interestingly,
the Second Circuit drew on a Supreme Court copyright case, the wellknown Sony v. Universal Studios case,129 for support. In Sony, the Court
compared the Inwood standard to the standard used for contributory
liability in copyright cases, stating that the Inwood standard was
narrower and required knowledge of specific infringing individuals.130
This persuaded the Second Circuit that generalized knowledge did not
satisfy Inwood.131 Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the
court found that the general knowledge of counterfeiting supplied by
Tiffany was insufficient to impose contributory liability on eBay.132
But this finding did not end matters. In an important additional
section, the court held that a service provider may not “intentionally

124. Id. Tiffany did so claim in the District Court, which rejected the allegations, primarily
because eBay promptly terminated those listings, and often those sellers’ accounts, once given
information that they were selling counterfeits. Id. However, Tiffany abandoned that claim on
appeal, and the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement with the District Court’s ruling. Id.
125. Id. at 107.
126. Id. at 106.
127. Id. at 106-07. Such as the ones by sellers that Tiffany identified to eBay. Id.
128. Id. at 107.
129. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
130. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 108 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 500 (1984)).
131. Id. at 107.
132. Id. at 109. See also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 546-49 (E.D.
Va. 2010) (providing another example of online trademark use where Google’s sale of trademarks
for comparative advertising was found not to be contributorily infringing) (citing Tiffany, 600 F.3d
at 109); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1187 (D. Utah 2010) (holding
an advertiser defendant was not contributorily liable for infringing ads used by some of its 10,000
affiliates unless it had specific knowledge of the identities of the infringers) (citing Tiffany, 600 F.3d
at 109). See infra text accompanying notes 152-211.
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shield[] itself from discovering” the identities of the direct infringers.133
However, the court found that eBay used significant efforts to combat
counterfeit sales and did not become willfully blind to the identity of
such sellers.134
Although eBay advertised the availability of Tiffany-branded
merchandise on its website, the Second Circuit disagreed with the
District Court regarding Tiffany’s claim of false advertising.135 The
court found that this advertising was not literally false because there
were genuine Tiffany articles for sale,136 and the Second Circuit found
that at this stage of the litigation, it could not say definitively that the
advertisements did not mislead consumers into believing that all of the
Tiffany merchandise for sale on eBay was genuine.137 However, the
court also noted that a disclaimer may suffice to make the ads truthful;
an investigation into the genuineness of each item for sale was not
required.138
In terms of contributory liability, Tiffany ultimately breaks little
new doctrinal ground. However, its strong affirmation of the need for
specific knowledge is an important statement.139 As the court noted,
European courts have been more favorably disposed toward trademark
owners.140 Thus, Tiffany illustrates an important distinction between
U.S. law and European law. Moreover, it appears that the court was
concerned about allowing a trademark owner to eliminate competition in
the aftermarket for its goods.141 That competitive concern is consistent
with recent Supreme Court opinions in trademark law.142 From a
practical standpoint, the requirement that for online auctioneers and
other intermediaries to be held liable they must have specific
information about infringement, means that imposing contributory
liability on such defendants will be very difficult.143 On the cautionary
side for defendants, however, is the court’s treatment of the issue of
willful blindness.144 In this case, eBay took great pains and spent a lot of
133. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109.
134. Id. at 110.
135. Id. at 113.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 114.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 107.
140. Id. at 105 n.9 (citing various cases and articles).
141. See id. at 103.
142. See generally David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New
Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659 (2004).
143. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107-09.
144. Id. at 109.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012

15

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 6 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3

9- WELKOWITZ_MACRO FINAL.DOCM

60

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

5/25/2012 1:14 PM

[6:45

money to minimize sales of counterfeits.145 It is unclear what would be
required of less well-financed defendants faced with similar or
analogous allegations.
As an aside, another case reminds us that contributory liability
requires that there be direct infringement.146 In Georgia-Pacific
Consumer Products, LP v. Myers Supply, Inc.,147 a case involving paper
towel dispensers and paper towels, the court held that consumers would
not be confused by the use of towels not made by the manufacturer of
the dispenser, hence no contributory (or direct) infringement.148
VII. ADWORDS ………… AGAIN!
Google’s AdWords program is a seemingly endless source of
trademark cases. It sparked a lively debate about whether the sale of
trademarked words to competitors of trademark owners to trigger
displays of competitive advertising constitutes a “use in commerce”
under the Lanham Act.149 Lately, AdWords cases have largely moved
beyond preliminary skirmishes to the issue of whether the program is, in
fact, likely to cause confusion. Two district court cases in the past year
provide interesting and, in one case, quite novel analyses of the problem:
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc. 150 and 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
Lens.com, Inc.151
Rosetta Stone raised a variety of trademark issues, from direct
infringement to contributory and vicarious liability,152 to functionality
and even dilution.153
As to infringement, the court analyzed the issue under the Fourth
Circuit’s multifactor test; however, it focused on only three of the
factors: Google’s intent, evidence of actual confusion, and “the
consuming public’s sophistication.”154 Regarding intent, the court
145. See id. at 98-100 (discussing eBay’s efforts).
146. Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 621 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 2010).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 773-76 (noting that the Fourth Circuit previously denied defendant’s motion for
summary judgment in a similar case involving the same plaintiff, see Ga.-Pac., 618 F.3d 441.
However, the Eighth Circuit noted that the case before it involved a bench trial, not a denial of
summary judgment. Ga.-Pac., 621 F.3d at 775-76.
149. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125-30 (2d Cir. 2009).
150. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010).
151. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Utah 2010).
152. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 540-41. Vicarious liability imposes liability on
defendant for the act of another over whom defendant is responsible. Id. Contributory liability
imposes liability for defendant’s own acts inducing or aiding the direct infringement of another. Id.
153. Id. at 534-35.
154. Id. at 540-41.
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rejected Rosetta Stone’s assertion that Google’s desire to profit from the
sale of trademarks as search keywords demonstrated intent to confuse.155
Rather, the court distinguished an intent to profit (which Google had)
from an intent to confuse (which it did not have).156 In this case, the
court noted that causing confusion was antithetical to Google’s business
interests.157 Google wants users to obtain useful information from
searches and would be harmed if the links it provides lead users astray or
lead to purchases of counterfeit goods.158 Turning to actual confusion,
the court noted that Rosetta Stone relied on precedent that related to a
significantly different situation—a competitive goods case (Rosetta
Stone and Google do not compete) and a 30-40% rate of consumer
confusion. Here, the confusion was experienced by only five people out
of more than 100,000 displays, a sum the court termed de minimis.159
Significantly, all of the confused individuals knew that they were not
purchasing from Rosetta Stone, although they did believe that Rosetta
Stone produced the program they bought.160 Rosetta Stone’s other
evidence of confusion was considered inadequate as well.161 Most
interesting was the court’s rejection of evidence of possible confusion of
endorsement by Google of Rosetta Stone.162 Finally, the court found
that given the cost of Rosetta Stone’s program and the goal of the
purchase, learning a foreign language, potential consumers were likely
to be sophisticated, which pointed away from confusion.163 Thus, the
court found no direct infringement by Google and granted summary
judgment on this issue.164
Most notable was the court’s next topic, functionality.165 If a
trademark is “functional,” then it is not protected.166 Normally,
functionality is associated with a physical feature, such as shape, color,

155. Id. at 541.
156. Id. at 542.
157. Id.
158. Id. The court also noted that a revision of Google’s trademark policy was tied to an
automation of its system for verifying sponsored links before they are displayed, not to any desire to
cause confusion. Id.
159. Id. at 542-43. Moreover, the confused individuals viewed advertisements that did not
conform to Google’s policies and purchased counterfeit items. Id.
160. Id. at 543-44.
161. Id. at 544. Much of it was complaints about counterfeits, none of which came through
Google. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 545.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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or design, which gives the product a competitive advantage. This is
reflected in the test for functionality: “if it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”167
In this case, the court found functionality based on the fact that the sale
of trademarked words is essential to the operation (“cost or quality”) of
Google’s AdWords program, as it generates needed revenue and
provides useful competitive advertising.168 This is a highly unusual use
of functionality—one that was apparently rejected by the Ninth Circuit
in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.169
Normally, functionality turns on whether the feature gives the plaintiff a
market advantage not derived from its brand reputation. Here, the court
focused on the detriment to Google without regard to its ability to
compete against Rosetta Stone.170 It will be worth watching how the
Fourth Circuit addresses this issue.
Rosetta Stone’s other arguments were similarly unavailing.171 The
court applied the Second Circuit’s decision in Tiffany (NJ), Inc. v. eBay,
Inc.172 and found neither inducement nor a continuing sale of keywords
with specific knowledge that the purchaser sold counterfeit
merchandise.173 Following the Second Circuit’s lead, the court found
that generalized knowledge of counterfeit sales from sponsored links
was insufficient, and Rosetta Stone’s evidence of specific knowledge
was insufficient as well.174 The related argument of vicarious liability
was rejected on the grounds that Google did not exercise control over the
advertisers simply by having a financial relationship with them.175
Finally, the court disposed of Rosetta Stone’s dilution claims on
three grounds.176 First, it found that Google’s use was a fair use, thus
excluded by section 43(c)(3)(A).177 That section excludes “[a]ny fair use
. . . of a famous mark . . . .”178 The court apparently viewed Google’s
use as one involving “advertising or promotion that permits consumers
167. Id. (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001)).
168. Id. at 546.
169. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1030-31 (9th Cir.
2004).
170. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
171. Id.
172. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647
(2010). This decision is discussed supra text accompanying notes 114-45.
173. Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 546-49.
174. Id. at 548-49.
175. Id. at 549-50.
176. Id. at 550-52.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006)).
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to compare goods or services.”179 Second, the court noted that, in
conformance with the statutory exclusion, Google did not use the
Rosetta Stone mark as its own trademark.180 Finally, the court found
that since Google’s use began, the awareness of Rosetta Stone’s mark
had increased, obviating any claim of impairment of its distinctiveness.
As a result, there was no evidence of harm to the mark owner’s
reputation resulting from the sales of counterfeit goods.181 The dilution
claim was rejected.182
The 1-800 Contacts case is interesting because, unlike Rosetta
Stone, it involved a suit by the mark owner against the competitor who
purchased the trademark as a keyword.183 Moreover, this case involved
uses on search engines in addition to Google.184 The court addressed
several important issues: use in commerce, direct infringement, and
secondary liability.185
As to use in commerce, the court sided with the other courts that
have found the purchase of keywords to be a use in commerce,
notwithstanding the fact that the trademark may not be displayed in the
sponsored link.186 With regard to confusion, the court held that there
was no direct infringement by confusion resulting from defendant’s
purchase of keywords.187 Most notably, the court disagreed with the
plaintiff’s characterization of defendant’s use as a “bait and switch.”
The court noted that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,188 which used
the same characterization where defendant used plaintiff’s mark in a
metatag, represented a misunderstanding of the functioning of search
engines.189 The court cited the many possible choices that appear on a
search engine’s results page and stated that “[w]hen the link does not
incorporate a competitor’s mark ‘in any way discernable to internet users

179. Id. at 550-51 (citing § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 552.
183. 1-800 Contact Lens Inc v. Lens.com Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1158 (D. Utah 2010).
184. Id. at 1163-65.
185. Id. at 1157.
186. Id. at 1170. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009).
187. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. 2d. at 1181-82.
188. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
189. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1172-73. The Brookfield opinion found “initial
interest confusion” as a result of the “bait and switch.” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1162. More
recently, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Brookfield in Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced
System Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2011) in a manner that hinted that
criticisms of Brookfield may be gaining traction in that court.
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and potential customers,’ there is ‘no opportunity to confuse . . . .’”190
The court further stated that imposing liability “would result in an anticompetitive, monopolistic protection, to which [plaintiff] is not
entitled.”191 Thus, the mere use of plaintiff’s trademark to trigger a
linked ad could not be deemed infringing.192 When the court analyzed
the factors of confusion, it found that sponsored links not containing
plaintiff’s mark were not likely to cause confusion.193 However, some
advertisements generated by defendant’s affiliates did contain plaintiff’s
mark and, as to those, the court found likely confusion.194 The
“affiliates” were not necessarily entities known to defendant, however,
leading to the discussion of secondary liability.195
In an analysis similar to that of Rosetta Stone,196 the court
concluded that defendant did not exercise control over the wording of
the affiliate’s advertisement and, therefore, could not be held vicariously
liable to those acts.197 Furthermore, there was no evidence of
inducement, thus eliminating one branch of contributory liability.198 As
to the second branch—continuing to deal with the infringer with
knowledge (“know or should have known”) of its infringement—only a
small subset of the affiliate ads directly infringed.199 Also, the plaintiff
failed to provide sufficient information for defendant to identify the
infringers.200 Defendant had taken steps to identify the offenders after
the suit was brought, but the court found that it lacked sufficient
information to do so and to stop the infringement.201 This result is
consistent with both Rosetta Stone202 and Tiffany,203 which refused to
impose liability based on generalized knowledge of infringement by
others.204
190. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (quoting J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C Ltd. P’ship.
v. Settlement Funding, LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 288, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4
2007)).
191. Id. at 1174.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1175.
194. Id. at 1182.
195. Id.
196. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 549 (E.D. Va. 2010).
197. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. at 1183-84.
198. Id. at 1185.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1186-87.
201. Id. at 1187.
202. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 548 (E.D. Va. 2010).
203. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
647 (2010).
204. 1-800 Contact Lens, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-87.
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Thus far, while courts appear to be finding the purchase of
keywords to satisfy the use in commerce requirement, they are not
inclined to impose liability on Google or its advertisers. An exception
may be where the sponsored link displays plaintiff’s mark in a confusing
manner, and then liability would only be on the offending advertiser.
Google also triumphed, at least partly, in Europe, although on
different grounds.205 In Google France S.A.R.L. v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier,206 the European Court of Justice held that the sale of
trademarks as keywords was not a “use in the course of trade,” and
therefore was not actionable for confusion under European trademark
law.207
VIII. RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND THE “COMMERCIALIZATION”
OF AN IMAGE
Rights of publicity, which might be called a form of individual
branding, raise numerous issues, some of which are unique, others of
which are infused with issues from trademark and copyright. The
problems in this area are compounded by the primacy of non-uniform
state laws, as opposed to federal laws which are applicable in most other
areas of intellectual property. Over the past year or so, several cases
have tested the divide between using the celebrity image as an
informational vehicle, which is normally considered protected speech,
and using it as a commercial vehicle, which is normally actionable. This
balancing act is not a new one, but recent cases present it in some new
and interesting ways.
A good example of the problem was Keller v. Electronic Arts,
Inc.208 Keller challenged the unauthorized use by Electronic Arts (EA)
of the likenesses of various college football players in a video game.209
Under California law, which applied to Keller’s claim against EA, one
key is whether the use is considered “transformative,” in which case it is
205. Case C-236/08, Google France S.A.R.L. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 E.C.R. 30.
206. Id.
207. Id. However, the ECJ held that the advertiser’s purchase of the keyword was a “use in the
course of trade” and thus potentially actionable. Id. If the advertiser were to be liable even in the
absence of confusion, then the AdWords program would not work. European law allows an
infringement claim if one makes an unauthorized use of a mark that is identical to a registered mark.
Id.
208. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
209. Id. at 1132. EA actually licensed the use, but not from the players; it obtained a license
from the National Collegiate Athletic Association and Collegiate Licensing Company. EA did not
use the actual names of the athletes in the game, though consumers may be able to obtain that
information online and input it into the game. Id. at 1132.
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fully protected by the First Amendment.210 Here, the court held that the
use was not sufficiently transformative to claim protection.211 The court
stressed the realism of the video game setting and the close copying of
plaintiff’s virtual identity as a quarterback at Arizona State University
into the game.212 The court also rejected the argument that the game,
broadly speaking, was transformative, focusing instead on its depiction
of the plaintiffs.213 This emphasis on realism tracked the California
Supreme Court’s ruling in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup,214
where the court upheld a claim where the use was considered a literal
depiction of the Three Stooges in a photographic manner (although the
use was not a photograph, but a drawing) on lithographs and t-shirts.215
The use in Keller, however, extends Saderup because each depiction is
not sold by itself.216 Rather, the various player depictions are part of a
larger whole in which each player is a relatively small component.217
The court then turned to the asserted public interest defense.218 EA
compared its use to the use of major league player names and statistics,
video clips, and game programs on the Major League Baseball web
site.219 However, the court found the comparison to what it termed
“presentations of historical data” with a video game inapposite.220 The
court also distinguished a more commercial use, the use of player names
and statistics in fantasy leagues,221 which the Eighth Circuit permitted in
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P.222 Here, the distinction was less clear; the court thought that
because EA’s game used “the virtual players,” there was a significant
difference in the analysis, though it did not explain why.223

210. Id. at 1134. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 25 Cal. 4th 387, 406-09 (2001),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002).
211. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1134.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th 387.
215. Id. at 407-09.
216. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1135. In a later case, on very similar facts, a district court in
New Jersey ruled that the use in a video game was transformative. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., Civil
Action No. 09–cv–5990 (FLW), 2011 WL 4005350 (D.N.J. 2011). Unlike Keller, Hart was decided
on a more complete record. Id. at *24 (noting the difference).
217. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1135.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1136. See Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (2001).
220. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1136.
221. Id.
222. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d
818 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1090 (2008).
223. Keller, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1136.
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A related issue was discussed in Dryer v. National Football
League,224 where former football players sued the NFL for using video
footage from games as part of a series of videos used to promote the
NFL.225 As in Keller, the primary issue was whether the defendant’s
actions were protected speech.226 In Dryer, the court viewed the
problem as whether the use would be considered commercial speech,
which would give it less protection than ordinary speech.227 The issue of
commercial speech and rights of publicity is not new. The Ninth Circuit
discussed the issue in Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,228 and took a
narrow view of commercial speech—that it is speech that “does not
more than propose a commercial transaction.”229 However, courts have
not always agreed on the proper definition of commercial speech. The
Dryer court chose to use a three-part test derived from an Eighth Circuit
case,230 which looks at (1) whether the speech in question is an
advertisement, (2) whether it refers to a specific product or service, and
(3) the economic motivation of the speaker.231 Although the Eighth
Circuit had previously held that using player names and statistics in a
fantasy league was protected speech,232 the Dryer court believed that
those cases were distinguishable.233 The court asserted that the prior
cases only used “information [that] was already in the public domain.”234
The court also distinguished the California Court of Appeal ruling in
Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball,235 in which the court dismissed a
claim that Major League Baseball’s use of photographs and video clips
on its web site violated plaintiff’s right of publicity, notwithstanding the
promotional aspect of the use.236 Although it acknowledged the
similarity of the two cases, the Dryer court stated that “the Gionfriddo
court did not consider or comment on whether the challenged uses . . .
constituted an advertisement for the purposes of the commercial speech

224. Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (D. Minn. 2010).
225. Id. at 1115.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1116.
228. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
229. Id. at 1184.
230. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 1120 (8th Cir. 1999).
231. See Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1117-19.
232. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d
818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1090 (2008). Accord CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l
Football League Players Ass’n, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 2009).
233. Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
234. Id.
235. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (2001).
236. Id. at 411-14.
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inquiry.”237 Thus, the court denied the NFL’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings.238
Keller and Dryer indicate that courts may be inclined to protect
rights of publicity where the use is a mixture of information and
promotion or commerciality.239 However, both cases were decided on
the pleadings, not on a full record, and only held that the plaintiffs had
stated a claim.240 Therefore, one must read them with a certain amount
of caution. Additionally, the courts of appeals have yet to be heard from
in these cases. They are worth watching.
IX. POSTSCRIPT: BOOP BOOP BE DOOP, OR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRADEMARK TWO-STEP
In early 2011, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Fleischer
Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.241 that looked to be a significant revival
and expansion of the aesthetic functionality doctrine the court discussed
more than thirty years before in International Order of Job’s Daughters
v. Lindeburg & Co.242 Fleischer involved the copyright and trademark
rights to the Betty Boop character and name, created in 1930.243 On the
issue of trademark rights, the Ninth Circuit held that Job’s Daughters
was “directly applicable” to the case.244 Because defendant was using
the Betty Boop character as ornamentation (or as the product itself) for
its own aesthetic value, not as a source identifier for defendant’s goods,
the court held the use to be aesthetically functional.245 Potentially,
Fleischer could have rendered many uses of images and characters (e.g.,
Mickey Mouse) non-infringing (assuming the absence of a valid
copyright!). Fleischer also leads to interesting questions about the
distinction between this use of aesthetic functionality and the rejection of
237. Dryer, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
238. Id. at 1121.
239. Note that, as of this writing, the Keller decision is on appeal, and the issue of rights of
publicity of college athletes is the subject of a multi-plaintiff, multidistrict litigation. See In re
NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09–1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256
(N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011).
240. See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Dryer, 689 F.
Supp. 2d at 1115.
241. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion
withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011).
242. Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980).
243. Fleischer, 636 F.3d at 1117.
244. Id. at 1124.
245. Id. The court also cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), for the proposition that trademark law cannot be used
to preclude a copyrighted image from entering the public domain. Fleischer, 636 F.3d at 1124-25.
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the application of that doctrine in Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen
Though the two cases are potentially
of America, Inc.246
distinguishable—Fleischer involved a character,247 whereas AuTomotive Gold involved a word (and logo) mark248—discerning the
boundaries of the two cases would have been an interesting task for
lower courts.
However, that problem was avoided when the Ninth Circuit
subsequently withdrew the opinion, replacing it with one that came to
almost the same result but on a different rationale (at least for the
trademark claims).249 The new opinion held that plaintiff’s evidence of
trademark registration of the image was untimely, and that its evidence
of secondary meaning was legally insufficient.250 The court then found
issues of fact remaining on the issue of validity and infringement of the
word mark “Betty Boop,” and remanded to the district court.251 Thus,
the aesthetic functionality issue must await another day, although the
original opinion is a tantalizing preview of a possible future opinion.

246. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1073-74 (9th Cir.
2006).
247. Fleischer, 636 F.3d at 1117.
248. Au-Tomotive, 457 F.3d at 1064. See also Fleischer, 636 F.3d at 1173-74 (“there is no
evidence that consumers buy Auto Gold’s products solely because of their ‘intrinsic’ aesthetic
appeal. Instead, the alleged aesthetic function is indistinguishable from and tied to the mark’s
source-identifying nature”).
249. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A. Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Apparently,
a motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was made, but mooted by the new opinion. Id. at 960.
250. Id. at 966. The court held that without the presumption of validity afforded by
registration, plaintiff had to show secondary meaning. Id. The court offered no explanation for why
the image could not be inherently distinctive, although the Supreme Court’s opinion in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), could be the answer.
251. A.V.E.L.A., 654 F.3d at 968.
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